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Abstract
Air traffic congestion has made large-scale, fast-time simulations desirable for testing air
traffic management system enhancements. In order to effectively model several sectors,
hundreds of aircraft may be required. The use of autonomous agents to control simulated
aircraft is one solution to this problem, but requires a model of pilot behavior to ensure
that the agents correctly represent the interactions between weather and other aircraft.
Pilot behavior in the presence of weather was assessed using a survey and a set of
scenarios involving static tactical encounters between an enroute jet transport aircraft and
one or two significant weather cells. The subject pilot planned a new routing, if desired,
by interactively designating waypoints on a navigation display with weather depiction.
The data was analyzed to determine relationships between a pilot's preferred route and
weather size, severity, and distance from the route. A preliminary behavior model was
developed based on a Bayesian belief network, taking the route's closest point of
approach and distance from weather cells of varying intensities as inputs, and providing a
weather threat rating as an output. This output was then used to determine if the current
route was acceptable, and if not, what proximity to weather must be achieved in a new
route. The model was tuned using the initial pilot behavior data and then validated using
a second set of scenario conditions. Performance of the model in terms of generating
new routes around weather was consistent with pilot-generated routes for the same
situations, suggesting that the method may be viable for driving large-scale traffic
simulations. A randomized model is also proposed that may better capture the potential
variability in pilot response to a given situation. Finally, recommendations are given to
expand the modeling effort to capture variability across different pilots and aircraft types,
as well as to manage more complex and realistic weather encounter situations.
Thesis Supervisor: James K. Kuchar
Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.0 Introduction
Currently, the capacity of the Air Traffic Control system is being pushed to the limit.
To compensate, new tools are needed that can model system interactions and allow
validation and testing of system enhancements. System enhancements are focused on
improving overall efficiency, with the improved rerouting of aircraft in adverse weather
being an area of high potential benefit. However, extensive validation and testing is
required since any modification of the air traffic management system must not reduce the
current safety level.
Current testing procedures require human pilots, air traffic controllers, and airline
operations controllers, which is untractable for a large simulation requiring hundreds of
aircraft that contains many sectors of control. One solution to the problem is to use
pseudo-pilots where a pilot controls multiple aircraft through a computer workstation.
The primary drawback of pseudo-pilots is that simulations would require additional
personnel and the scripting of major events. Simulations would also be limited to real-
time since human pseudo-pilots cannot operate in "fast-time". One solution to this
problem is the development of autonomous agents that simulate at least some subset of
pilot and controller behavior. The advantage of using agents are that experiments can be
run over a long period of time, repeated continually with subtle changes in parameters,
and also be run in "fast time" to get many simulations run in a relatively short time. As
shown in Figure 1, the human's behavior is modeled and used in the "fast time"
simulation. The simulation is run, but situations may arise that were not well covered in
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the model and these are referred back to a human during a follow-on simulation study.
The model is then updated with the results from the human in the loop simulation and the
cycle repeats.
Behavioral Model
Human in the Fast-Time
Loop Simulation Simulations
Critical Situation
Figure 1 Relation of Human in the Loop Simulations and Fast-Time Simulations
1.1 Large Simulation with Autonomous Agents
One approach to simulating the system is to treat each aircraft and controller as an
independent autonomous agent. Each autonomous agent is made up of two primary
pieces: a Situational Awareness model and a Decision model as shown in Figure 2
(Harper, K., et al., 1998). The agent also interacts with the environment, which includes
other aircraft and hazards. The situational awareness model is defined by capturing the
human pilot's or controller's behavior and converting it into a set of rules or behaviors.
Accurate quantification of the qualitative and subjective information from the human
subjects presents the most challenge in this process. The primary purpose of the
situational awareness model is to break down the current situation into quantifiable
elements that can be used to make decisions. The decision model then defines the
appropriate course of action to take in a particular situation. However, in the same
situation two humans could disagree on the correct course of action to be taken. In many
ways any large-scale simulation would have to simulate the varied or inconsistent
behavior across many different people if it is to present an accurate representation of the
16
operational system. To fully simulate the interactions in the real system the independent
agents communicate with each other through passive methods such as their actions and
also through active methods like sharing information or intent.
Autonomous Agent
Situational
Environment Awareness a Dc
Modeel
Figure 2 Autonomous Agent Model
1.2 Weather Issues
In general, the capacity of the air traffic control system is most taxed on days where
adverse weather limits the number of flight operations, departures and arrivals, that can
be conducted over a time period. This reduction in operational efficiency leads to delays
and cancellations. The FAA maintains an Air Traffic Control (ATC) System Command
Center that monitors the effect of weather on operations, but focuses on strategic and
system-wide solutions like the Ground Delay Program which reduces the number of
aircraft in flight under these conditions.
Though tools have been developed that help to optimize various issues such as aircraft
routing and sequencing, departure planning, and maintaining aircraft separation, these
tools do not directly address the effect of weather on airspace operations. Weather tools
are generally limited to the prediction of motion and severity of adverse weather, but do
not attempt to optimize individual aircraft operations using the constraints posed by the
weather. Understanding how pilots perceive and operate around weather would be
17
extremely useful in designing decision-aids that might help in reducing delays and
increase efficiency.
1.3 Effects of Traffic on Weather Avoidance
Weather and traffic are highly interconnected since avoiding weather may result in a
solution that conflicts with an aircraft that is also attempting to avoid weather. Figure 3
shows an example of traffic conflicts that occurred during one study of pilot/ATC
information sharing (Farley & Hansman 1999). The figure shows six aircraft in close
proximity to a break in the weather, where two of the aircraft DAL768 and DAL189 are
at the same altitude and within 5 nmi of each other thus violating separation standards.
Such traffic situations may occur because adverse weather constrains the number of
possible routes. Particular routes such as routing through breaks in the weather may
quickly become congested, resulting in a sharp increase in the workload of the Air Traffic
Controller. Though the route through the hole in the weather is highly desirable,
congestion might make it unacceptable and another less desirable route must be chosen
instead. A similar interaction occurs when two aircraft have a conflict with each other.
The conflict requires another route to be chosen, but the new route might be unacceptable
if it does not meet the pilot's weather criteria.
18
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Figure 3 Conflict of Traffic & Weather Avoidance Example
(Farley & Hansman, 1999)
1.4 Thesis Outline
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The primary goal of this thesis is to develop a model of pilot behavior in adverse
weather conditions. Some preliminary pilot data was gathered and used to design and
implement a prototype agent.
The outline of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background information
for the research in this thesis, Chapter 3 presents the experimental design and the raw
data and conclusions, and Chapter 4 describes two prototype decision models that were
created using the data from the experiment. Finally, Chapter 5 contains a summary of the
research.
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Chapter 2 Background
2.0 Background
Hazards constantly impose constraints on decisions, making the understanding of
decision-making in the presence of hazards an important goal. Adverse weather is one of
the common hazards for commercial pilots, and developing a model of pilot behavior in
the presence of weather could have important benefits for the safety and efficiency of air
transportation. To begin to understand pilot behavior, it is necessary to develop models
that can represent observed behavior and ultimately predict future behavior in a variety of
conditions.
Figure 4 shows a model of a pilot's multi-staged decision-making process (Endsley,
1995). A pilot's situational awareness is developed through a three staged process:
Detection and analysis, assessment, and prediction. With each stage a clearer
understanding of the weather hazard and the current and potential future effect on the
aircraft become better understood. In the first stage, various information sources are used
to detect and then analyze a weather cell, which results in data about the position and
severity of the weather hazard. In the assessment stage, a pilot would then determine the
hazard's risk and overall threat to the aircraft. During the final stage of situational
awareness the pilot creates an internal model of future positions and severity of the
weather cell. With this information the pilot can determine the appropriate resolution
maneuver, either to continue as originally planned or reroute on a different path that
avoids the hazard.
21
Figure 4 Basic Situational Awareness Model (Endsley, 1995)
Situational awareness is rarely 100% complete under normal conditions which is due
to various uncertainties in the information sources or incorrect models of a hazard's risk
or movement. Generally information sources have at least some uncertainty about a
hazard's position, size, severity, and future path. This uncertainty propagates through the
process and can reduce overall pilot awareness of everything around the aircraft. Pilots
counteract this uncertainty in their information sources by fusing the data gathered from
several independent sources and by following time-based changes in the data.
2.1 Weather Information Sources and Prior Research
The cockpit contains several different information systems for weather hazards. On
commercial aircraft, the primary source is the weather radar, which gives information on
precipitation intensity, size, and position relative to the aircraft. All three of these allow
the pilot to assess the overall risk of a particular weather cell. Precipitation intensity is
considered to be an indicator of severity and is normally shown using a four-color scale;
Green represents light intensity, yellow moderate intensity, red severe intensity, and
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magenta for turbulence. Some displays use intermediate shades to provide more exact
information on severity, while others reassign red to high intensity and use magenta for
severe.
The view from the cockpit window provides visual indications of weather position,
cell shape and structure, cell height, and lightning intensity, which are all indicators of
weather severity. However, the windows become significantly less useful at night, when
already in a cloud, or for long-range planning.
Weather information from controllers and other pilots is also a valuable source of
information. Ground based radar gives a different view on the storm activity, though in
many instances the radar information is not available to controllers since current enroute
ATC displays do not display weather information. However, controllers will often draw
out on their screens where they believe weather is, based on pilot diversion requests and
pilot reports (PIREPS), which helps them to predict future diversions and route requests.
PIREPS provide information about intensity, location, and effects on the aircraft.
Information is also shared over the radio channel with ATC. The information is often
referred to as "Party-line" information, since information is being shared over a common
channel. Even though it is directed at ATC, other pilots in the area use it to form a model
of particularly adverse weather or future requests by ATC.
2.1.1 Effects of Weather in the Approach Sector
In one previous study, pilot behavior was measured by using radar data from the
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport (Rhoda & Pawlak, 1998). The study focused on pilot
reactions within the approach region and found several interesting results. One result was
that as the distance to the runway goes down the pilot becomes less averse to flying
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through severe weather. The study suggested that pilots more or less will fly through
even the most severe weather cells when they are within 25 km of the runway. The study
also asserted that aircraft that were arriving more than 15 minutes late also tended to
penetrate severe weather more often than planes that were early or on-time. It can be
surmised that airline on-time statistics might be a driving factor because the current
definition of on-time is if the aircraft arrives within 15 minutes of the scheduled flight
time. A strong correlation was also found that suggested pilots would follow the path of
a preceding plane through weather. This fact might be related to "party-line" information
passed between pilots either on the ATC channel or through pilot reports (PIREPS).
2.1.2 Effects of Lead Aircraft on Pilot Decision-Making
A further study of "Party Line" information transfer suggested that lead aircraft act as
distributed sensors for following aircraft (Hyams & Kuchar, 1999). The information
provided through this channel is used primarily as a supplement to the weather radar and
was most useful when the impact of weather along the original route was ambiguous.
2.1.3 Prior Research on Modeling Tactical Rerouting around Weather
Other research has focused on developing models that can create new aircraft routes in
the terminal area to balance weather avoidance against the resulting delay. Krozel, et al.
(1997) have proposed a computational method that optimizes aircraft routings based on
assigning penalty weights to varying levels of weather severity. Their work has explored
several methods (e.g., Dijkstra's algorithm or Snell's Law of refraction) for representing
weather and efficient ways of processing and developing new routes. The result is a
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potential controller tool to reroute aircraft tactically and rapidly based on current weather
information.
The research presented in this thesis, in contrast, focuses on specifically modeling
pilot behavior. The intent, therefore, is not to necessarily optimize routings, but rather to
capture pilot preferences and actions in the presence of weather.
2.2 Hazard Modeling
A hazard can be generally described as an object or state in a situation that affects
decision-making due to a potential negative outcome if it is ignored. In the aviation
environment, examples include weather, terrain, other aircraft, and turbulence. In
military applications missiles and radar sites are hazards, and hazards can also be more
intangible, like aircraft performance limits.
2.2.1 Hazard Types
Hazards can generally be clumped into either "soft" or "hard" hazards (Hyams, et al.,
1999). A "hard" hazard is defined as a hazard that cannot be entered without a
catastrophic effect and should be avoided. Examples of this type of hazard in the aviation
domain would be a collision with terrain or other aircraft. Some "hard" hazards may also
have established buffer zones around them that simulate a desire to maintain a certain
range from the "hard" hazard. Although not desirable, these zones can be penetrated and
in many ways are similar to a "soft" hazard.
A "soft" hazard is defined as a hazard whose boundary may be penetrated, but there is
risk associated with entry. The effects range from catastrophic to relatively benign
depending on the type of hazard. Examples include weather, stall, and missile sites. The
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decision to penetrate or avoid a "soft" hazard is much more complex and depends on
several factors such as the perceived risk, the cost associated with avoidance, and the
decision-maker's current goals.
2.2.2 Hazard Risk Models
The effects of a hazard vary depending on the type of hazard and how the
consequences of entering the hazard are manifested. For example an aircraft entering a
region of adverse weather has a different associated risk and consequences than an
aircraft entering an area controlled by a missile site. As a result several basic models
were developed to describe how a hazard's risk is quantified. The models all assume that
the hazard's position, size, and severity are perfectly known, though uncertainties in these
parameters can be added (Hyams et al., 1999).
The most basic model has been labeled "One-Shot" since the effect of the hazard can
only occur once, when the hazard is entered. This model assumes that the event occurs
with a probability of P. The risk of the hazard is a combination of the penalty associated
with the incident and the probability of it occurring. An example of this type of risk
could be a missile radar site. An aircraft entering the radar site's coverage zone is not
necessarily detected since the radar might not be functioning at that time. P is the
probability that the radar site is operating. Equation 1 displays a simple linear relation
where risk, R, is equal to the probability of an incident, P, times the cost associated with
the incident occurring, C.
R=P-C (1)
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Risk grows with increasing cost or probability of an incident. A "hard" hazard is simply
the limit of this equation where the probability of incident is 1. The equation thus
simplifies to the risk being equal to the incident cost.
A second model has been referred to as "exposure-dependent" since the risk level
accumulates with increasing exposure to the hazard. A good example of this model
would be a weather cell since the potential for a turbulence encounter is cumulative as the
length of exposure is increased. The risk would be a function of time as shown in
Equation 2 where risk, R, is equal to the incident cost, C, times the average incident rate,
p, times the hazard exposure time, t. Risk would increase as the exposure time, incident
rate, or the incident cost grows.
R = C -p -t (2)
A third model is one where the probability and cost of the event vary as the amount of
exposure increases. The probability of incident, P(t), and its cost, C(t), are a function of
the amount of hazard exposure time, t. An example of this might be flying through a
region of varying weather severity. Equation 3 shows that risk, R, is an integrated
function over a duration T. Risk would increase as the exposure time or incident cost
grows.
T
R= J C(t)- P(t) dt (3)
0
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2.2.3 General Decision Models
When presented with a hazard the decision-maker assesses the situation focusing on
the risk posed by the hazard, the risks and costs associated with maneuvering around the
hazard, and the goals of the decision-maker (Dershowitz, 1997). This assessment allows
the comparison between the current path and possible alternate routes. Figure 5 shows
how these various concerns are combined into a final decision about the correct
resolution. The decision-maker would weigh the risk of the original route versus the
risks and costs associated with the alternate routes with the goal of determining if the
reduced risk justified the cost of taking an alternate route. The decision-maker's goals
and constraints take into account other factors like the destination and available fuel.
These allow the decision-maker to determine the best of relatively equal options or
disregard options that break the current constraints. For example, flying around a
weather cell may not be beneficial if the aircraft becomes fuel critical as a result.
28
Figure 5 General Decision Model Diagram
2.2.4 Weather Model
Representing adverse weather is a complex affair. However, since the focus of this
study is on the decision-maker's process and modeling various aspects of it, exact
modeling of the weather is not required. Certain simplifications can be made without
affecting the accuracy of the pilot model.
The weather radar display on an aircraft shows the data in four primary colors which
represent three severity levels and one turbulence level as shown in Figure 6. However,
the data tends to be amorphous in shape and pixellated, which makes it difficult to
determine specifically what the pilot is observing and reacting to. Simplifying the
weather through a set of ellipses allows for more accurate generation of metrics to
measure the pilot's intent, though at a loss of some realism.
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Figure 6 Example of Traditional Precipitation Display (Honeywell, 2000)
The simplification to use of ellipses to represent weather removes some of the gradient
information that pilots use in severity assessment. There are two primary types of
severity gradient effects, which are the severity transition distance and the close
proximity of multiple transitions shown in Figure 7. The severity transition distance is
the space over which the severity changes from one level to another. If this distance is
small there will be a single dividing line between two severity levels, signaling to the
pilot that the cell is well developed and more severe than a case where the edge is highly
pixellated and transitions over a larger distance. A similar type of signaling also occurs
when multiple transitions are in close proximity to each other. This type of situation tells
the pilot that this region of the storm is well developed and should be avoided.
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67,7
Less Severe Boundary Region Severe Region
Severity Transition Multiple Transitions
Distance in Close Proximity
Figure 7 Weather Transition Schematic
2.3 Effects of Weather on Decision-Making
Adverse weather strongly effects the decision-making of pilots, Airline Operations
Center personnel, and air-traffic controllers. A decision-maker in adverse weather
conditions would have to consider several different sources of information, such as
weather radar, other aircraft, or visual assessments, but the accuracy and validity of the
data must be considered. This analysis is the first step in forming a picture of the
situation around the aircraft. This picture is then used to assess the effect of weather on
the aircraft given its current route. If the default route is acceptable given the current
situation then the decision-maker would proceed as previously planned. If the original
route is not acceptable, the decision-maker would have to decide whether to penetrate or
divert around the dangerous region. This decision would require the decision-maker to
account for system-wide goals like the destination, characteristics of the aircraft,
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determination of the actual weather threat, and assessment of the uncertainty. All of
these issues contribute to making an informed decision.
2.3.1 Situation Assessment Models
Initial interviews during this study suggested that weather that was a larger distance
away would be perceived as less threatening so the pilot would defer a rerouting decision
until a future point. Under normal conditions the pilot would also defer decisions in this
case due to the increased uncertainty in weather position and severity as the distance to
the cell rises. Even over the relatively short period of time it takes to approach the hazard
the overall situation might change dramatically with it either becoming significantly
better or worse.
Since the focus was on tactical decision-making versus strategic, a large number of
possible geometries could be reduced to a couple of basic scenario types. Figure 8 shows
a scenario with a single weather cell that conflicts with the original route of the aircraft.
In making the decision about an alternate route, the pilot weighs economic and ATC
pressure versus the safety of the aircraft and passenger comfort. Economic issues such as
fuel cost drive the alternate route towards the original route since the original route would
have a shorter path distance than the alternate route. ATC generally wants to minimize
the amount of diversion since large diversions may interfere with the flow and
predictability of the aircraft in the sector. To maximize safety the pilot would prefer to
make a larger diversion maneuver to maximize the distance to the weather. A large
diversion is also preferred for passenger comfort since going around a weather cell would
offer a smoother ride.
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Weather Cell
Aircraft
Economic &
Pilot's Route
Preference
Safety/Passenger
Comfort Pressure
Figure 8 Single Cell Schematic
Figure 9 shows a route that is constrained by two weather cells. In this case the
original route would be optimal for safety, passenger comfort, and economics since any
deviation would result in a less preferable situation. Hypothetically, ATC might request
the subject pilot to deviate since this would create space for other aircraft to move
through the gap. It should be noted though that if the weather cells encroach further on
the route, a point will be reached where the original route's closest point of approach to
the weather cells would be unacceptable to the pilot due to safety and passenger comfort
concerns.
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Economic
Pressure
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Aircraft
Figure 9 Weather Constrained Route Schematic
ATC Pressure
2.4 Resolution Models
The pilot decides on the correct resolution maneuver by developing an awareness of
the current situation. Situational awareness is established when the pilot analyzes the
current route and the hazards and converts certain measured metrics such as weather
severity and range into a measure of the actual threat to the aircraft. If there are no
serious conflicts or it is too early to make the decision to reroute a pilot would most likely
continue along the current route. The pilot would continue to monitor the situation for
34
future conflicts or to wait for information to become more certain in the case of deferring
due to uncertainty. However, if a diversion is required the pilot would then decide to
choose a route that minimized the diversion while still satisfying the requirements
imposed by safety constraints.
2.5 Agent-based Pilot Models
Autonomous agents operate using a set of rules that describe the goals or intent of the
agent. The most basic agent model works by assimilating information from the simulated
environment and processing it into an understanding of that environment, which is often
referred to as situational awareness. One popular technique for this assimilation and
processing has been belief networks since it allows the agent to infer data that might be
true though the agent has no direct means to measure it. Another popular technique is an
expert system, which acts on a set of rules with predefined resolutions that are generated
by experts in the domain.
Both the situational awareness and decision model are calibrated from empirical data
gathered through experiments using scenarios or by using domain experts to define the
rules directly. However, in many cases a single experiment using one individual or
domain expert isn't sufficient to define the agent behavior since there is relatively large
variability in the actual decision making of particular individuals even given the same
goals. This variability has to be addressed in the development of the agent models.
Many times the actual goals of human operators are not well defined or are not
directly quantifiable. Typically there is not an exact rule that defines the relationship
between one variable and another and more often than not there are many variables that
when combined define the proper behavior. Even if the behavior is well understood,
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there is no guarantee that the implementation of the behavior will be on target. When it
comes to human subjects much of this can be explained by the "fuzzy" nature of human
thought.
2.5.2 Expert Systems
Expert systems are systems that use a series of rules to govern their behavior
(Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984). Experts in the field most often generate these rules, but
in some cases the rules can also be generated from empirical data of a system. Most
expert systems use rules in an "if-then" format where a series of conditions are tested for
validity in the "if' part of the statement to decide if the behavior in the "then" part of the
rule should be used. An example of the rule base is shown below:
If.
Weather severity is unacceptable
AND
Range to weather cell is less than 15 nmi
Then:
Divert around weather cell by choosing a route that maintains a minimum
distance of 5 nmi
An expert system's primary weakness is that the rule-base must cover all possible
situations that require action or the system will simply decide to do nothing since none of
the rules would apply.
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2.5.3 Belief Networks
Belief networks are another technique that allows some of the aspects of human
behavior to be captured (Pearl, 1988). Instead of using predefined rules the belief
network uses a series of nodes to represent various measurements or states within the
system. A simple example of a belief network is shown in Figure 10, which describes a
simple diagnostic of a car that assesses one reason why the car might not start. Nodes A,
B, C, and D represent basic conditions of the car such as the lights were left on overnight,
the battery is dead, the car won't start, and the driver arrives late to work. Each node has
a series of values that describe the probability of that node being in any particular state.
The values are normally stated in a vector as shown in Equation 4. For example, the "car
won't start" and "late to work" nodes contain two states, true and false, and as a result
would be described as a vector with two elements. The arrows between the nodes
represent the direction of conditional dependence between the nodes. For example,
whether the car starts depends directly on only whether the battery holds a charge, not on
whether the lights were left on. The relation between the various states is described by a
conditional probability matrix represented, for example, by MCD in Equation 5. This
matrix is the formal relation using Baye's Rule between the state vectors of node C and
D. The ith row and jth column of a conditional probability matrix between any two states
(say X and Y) represents the probability that the ith state of node Y is true given the jth
state of node X is true. The complete matrix then defines all possible conditional
probability relationships between the two nodes.
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Node C State Vector = PC 1
P (4)
D1
Node D State Vector = PD2
PD1 C1.[D2 =MCD 2 (5)
Example conditional probability matrices are shown in Figure 10. For example as shown
by MCD, if the engine won't start there is a 0.9 chance that the driver arrives late to work
and a 0.1 chance that the driver arrives on time anyway. If the engine does start the
probability that the driver is late to work drops to 0.3 and the probability they are on time
rises to 0.7.
The power of the belief network lies in the fact that assertions can be made about
measureable states, while probabilistic data about the unmeasurable or unmeasured states
can be inferred. For example, given an a priori assumption that the lights are left on 10%
of the time, the first column in Table 1 shows the resulting probabilities for each node.
With no prior information, the driver would be late to work 25.2% of the time. However,
if the person knows the car did not start this morning, recomputing the network changes
the probabilities to what is shown in column two. The probability of the lights having
been left on overnight has changed to 0.33, and of being late to work has been updated to
0.7. Thus, the network can be used both to diagnose the cause of a condition (e.g.,
diagnosing the likelihood that the lights were left on is the cause for the engine to not
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start) and also to examine the causal effect of information (e.g., whether the failure of the
car to start will cause the driver to be late).
Left Lights on
Overnight Battery is Dead Car won't Start
Arrives Late to
Work
M
M
M
AB
BC
CD
0
0
0
0
0
0
.9
.1
.9
.1
.9
.1
0
0
0
1
0
0
.2
.8
.0
.0-
.3
.7
Figure 10 Belief Network Example
Table 1 Belief Network Probabilities
Node States: A Priori Given Car Won't Start
(after computation)
Lights Left on 0.1 0.33
Dead Battery 0.17 0.67
Car won't start 0.253 1.0
Late to work 0.252 0.7
39
40
Chapter 3 Experimental Study
The development of a preliminary pilot model required actual pilot input and data for
modeling and calibration. The data were collected using several methods including
interviews, a scenario snapshot survey, and through the use of an interactive weather
display experiment.
3.1 Pilot Interviews and Survey
The interviews were intended to gather preliminary pilot preferences and determine
major factors affecting decision-making. Initial interviews were conducted in a series of
one-on-one interviews with a current captain of a major airline. The interview questions
were free response in order to probe the pilot's major concerns when in the presence of
severe weather. Follow on interviews fine tuned the model and led to the conclusion that
there were three primary goals that this pilot used to decide if a particular route was
acceptable. These in relative importance were safety, passenger comfort, and economic
efficiency, which agrees with similar information gathered by a previous survey (Hyams
& Kuchar, 1999).
Decision-making regarding safety is primarily concerned with the possibility of
catastrophic failure, such as a crash, damage to the aircraft, and injuries to the passengers
or the crew. The pilot uses a satisificing type of logic where the minimum safety
conditions are satisfied first, without regard for optimizing with other concerns.
Passenger comfort covers more of the area of prolonged exposure to lower severity levels
of weather, which cause discomfort for the passengers, while still remaining safe.
Economic issues such as fuel cost and the costs associated with aircraft delays also drive
41
route choice since unnecessary deviations affect airline profitability. Passenger comfort
and economic issues are often optimized relative to each other to improve overall route
desirability. Air Traffic Control (ATC) acceptance is also of importance since ATC is
responsible for maintaining separation and flow within a sector. Though the pilot has
final authority over the final acceptance of the route, the pilot will often negotiate taking
a less desirable route to satisfy ATC's preferences.
Using the information developed from the interviews a preliminary model of the
pilot's logic was developed as shown in Figure 11. The model's primary purpose is to
show the interactions between the various information elements with the overall route
acceptability. Safety, passenger comfort, and economic concerns for a particular flight
are the pilot's responsibility, while ATC acts independently and is concerned primarily
about system efficiency, aircraft flow, and traffic separation.
Figure 11 Preliminary Logic Model
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A survey was also conducted to begin to qualitatively assess the parameters and
metrics that a pilot uses when assessing adverse weather. An example of one of the
scenarios is shown in Figure 12 and a complete survey questionnaire is contained in
Appendix A. The first question asked if the pilot would continue along the specified
route, request a change, or if the pilot would have requested a change earlier than the
situation displayed. The second question requested the overall perceived safety estimate
for the scenario. The third question asked about the predicted passenger comfort level for
the given route. Thirty-eight scenarios were conducted with examples of each shown in
Figure 13. The main variables between the scenarios were the position of the weather
cells relative to the route, the range to the weather, and the extent of the weather.
Analyzing the data led to several conclusions. Green weather did not seem to be of major
importance to the pilot. The weather's along-track distance also seemed to have
relatively low effect when compared to simply being exposed to the yellow or red
severity levels.
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Yellow Weather Cell
Green Weather Cell
A---- Subject Aircraft
Figure 12 Survey Scenario Example
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Extent of Weather (6)
Severe Weather Lateral Proximity(6) Range (9)
Figure 13 Weather Survey Scenario Types
3.2 Weather Rerouting Experiment
An interactive weather display was built to allow the direct measurement of a pilot's
route selection with respect to known weather cells. The interactive weather display
simulated a standard cockpit weather radar display, but also allowed the pilot to draw up
to four different routes around the weather. Figure 14 shows an example scenario from
the experiment. The figure shows an example weather cell to the right of the aircraft's
original route, and also the pilot's revised reroute to the left to avoid the weather.
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Weather Cell
Revised Route
Subject Aircraft
Figure 14 Interactive Weather Display
3.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was run as a series of different scenarios in which a pilot was asked to
plot his preferred routes. The pilot was briefed that the aircraft was a commercial jet
transport currently in cruise, and was given a simulated view of the navigation display
including weather radar information. All scenarios were static snapshots, allowing the
pilot as much time as needed to think about whether a reroute was needed. The
instructions given also varied depending on the type of scenario, which fell into two
categories: a single cell along or near the original route, and cases with two cells
straddling the route. When the scenario only consisted of a single weather cell, the pilot
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was asked to plot the ideal route for the aircraft. When the scenario contained two
weather cells, the pilot was informed that ATC requested that the aircraft deviate as much
as acceptable to make room for other aircraft. This type of situation may occur when
aircraft are deviating through "holes" in adverse weather, which allows them to safely
navigate around severe weather cells. An initial route was also plotted for each of the
scenarios, which was simply proceeding straight. The pilot could then plot a new route,
if desired, using the computer mouse. If the pilot gave no additional routes, it was
assumed that the default route was considered acceptable. After completing a scenario
the pilot continued on to the next scenario. There was a total of fifty-one unique
scenarios.
3.3.1 Scenario Design
The scenarios were created with the intention of quantifying a pilot's behavior when
deviating around weather. Several properties of weather cells, as shown in Figure 15,
were manipulated to gather data on the effects of weather cell size and relative position.
The parameters included: cross-track (semi-major, a) and along-track (semi-minor, b)
axes, lateral position of the route to the weather's center (c), edge position (e), and the
distance from the aircraft to the weather's centerline (r).
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Figure 15 Weather Independent Variables
These sub-types were focused on testing particular aspects of the decision process and
any differences in perceptions to given different situations. There were three single cell
scenario sub-types: Lateral Coverage, Distance, and Lateral Position. There were two
sub-types of dual cell scenarios: Collocated centers and Non-Collocated centers. First, an
overview of each type is given, followed by the specific test conditions.
The Lateral Coverage scenarios were focused on eliciting behavior associated with
varying the size of the cross-track axis (a) while holding the along-track axis (b) constant.
The effect was to vary the amount of the screen covered by weather while holding the
along-track distance constant.
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(a) (b)
Figure 16 Schematic of Lateral Coverage Scenarios
The Distance scenario varied the range (r) of the weather from the subject aircraft and
in some cases the display scale. The primary purpose was to determine the range from
the hazard when the pilot left the default route and proceeded in diversion around the
weather. A secondary goal was to determine if there were any perception differences if
the weather was viewed at different display scales since the weather would be appear
larger or smaller depending on the scale.
(a) (b)
Figure 17 Schematic of Distance Scenarios
The Lateral Position scenarios allowed the determination of rerouting behavior around
weather cells that were not centered on the aircraft's current route. These scenarios were
also intended to determine if the rerouting behavior differed significantly from the
scenarios where the weather was centered. Lateral Position (c) and Edge Position (e)
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were varied (though these parameters were not independent since the size of the hazard
was held constant).
(a) (b)
Figure 18 Schematic of Lateral Position Scenarios
The Weather Corridor scenarios were a series of two-cell scenarios to elicit the minimum
acceptable distances from weather when the pilot's decision-making is constrained.
Symmetric weather constrained the available options since little or no space was free of
weather. Figure 19 shows the two different types of scenarios that were tested. The
collocated scenarios concentrated on testing the effect of two independent hazards in
close proximity. The non-collocated scenarios simulated a hole between two severe
weather cells in a convective line storm. A large green weather cell was centered on the
current route and the lateral position of the yellow and red weather cells were varied.
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Figure 19 Weather Corridor Scenario Examples
3.3.2 Test Matrices
Three categories of cell sizes were defined with different cross-track (a) and along-
track (b) axes. The cell dimensions used in the experiment are shown in Table 2. The
weather cells are related by constant ratios where a green cell of a given size is three
times larger then the red cell of the same size category. The yellow cell is two times
larger than a red cell of the same size category. The along-track axis was also kept
constant for each weather type to remove the effect of along-track distance on pilot
behavior.
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Table 2 Weather Dimensions
Type: Dimensions (Cross-Track x Along-Track Axes)
Green Yellow Red
Small (S) 15 x 15 nmi 10 x 10 nmi 5 x 5 nmi
Medium (M) 30 x 15 nmi 20 x 10 nmi 10 x 5 nmi
Large (L) 60 x 15 nmi 40 x 10 nmi 20 x 5 nmi
A constant display scale of 80 nmi was maintained in every type of scenario, with the
exception of the Distance scenarios where the scale was varied as an independent
variable.
The Lateral Coverage scenarios were tested using six different combinations of sizes
and three severities for a total of sixteen scenarios, which are shown in Table 3. Weather
included either a single green cell, G, a green and a yellow cell, GY, or a green, yellow,
and red cell, GYR. The small, medium, and large cases used fixed ratios of hazard sizes
that changed in their lateral dimension, as seen in Table 2. For example, LM/M
indicates a large green cell with dimensions 60x15 nmi, a medium yellow cell of 20x10
nmi, and a medium red cell of 10x5 nmi. The weather cells were centered on the route at
a distance (r) of 50 nmi. The L/S GY and L/M/S GYR scenarios were repeated once each
and are noted with a (x2).
Table 3 Lateral Coverage Scenario Specifications
Severity Size Combinations:
Level:
G S M L
GY S/S M/M L/S (x2) L/M L/L
GYR S/S/S M/M/M L/S/S L/M/S L/M/M L/L/L
(x2)
The Distance scenarios used five different combinations of range and display scales
along with three different severity levels as shown in Table 3. Cells with * represent the
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scenario conditions that were used. Overall there were a total of fourteen scenarios. The
weather cells were the Medium size and were held constant across all the scenarios. The
cases of 80 nmi distance at the 80 nmi scale and 160 nmi distance at the 160 nmi scale
were chosen to test if there was any difference in perception if the hazard was along the
top edge of the display. During the experiment the pilot was not allowed to change the
range setting of the display.
Table 4 Distance Scenarios Specifications
Range (r)_: (nmi) 40 80 160
Display Scale: (nmi) 80 80 160 160 320
G (M) _
GY (M/M) e___e 
_ e *(x2)
GYR (M/MIM) * . . .
The Lateral Position scenarios varied the cross-track distance of a single weather cell
from the default route and used two different severities as shown in Table 5. There were
a total of seven lateral position scenarios. The cells were all made up of the medium size
and their centers were collocated at a distance of 40 nmi ahead of the subject aircraft.
Three different lateral positions, c, were used: 15, 22.5, and 32.5 nmi which correspond
to the distance of the weather cell's center from the default route. Cases were conducted
with weather cells on both the right and left sides of the default route to test for any pilot
bias. The edge position is the minimum distance from the weather cell to the default
route. A negative value means that the weather cell does not intersect the default route
while a positive value means the route overlaps by that distance. As Table 5 shows the
15 nmi case had a yellow weather cell intersecting the route. The 22.5 and the 32.5 nmi
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cases did not have yellow or red weather extending across the default route. Green
weather overlapped the default route in both the 15 and 22.5 nmi scenarios.
Table 5 Lateral Position Scenario Specifications
Lateral Position (c): 15 nmi 22.5 nmi 32.5 nmi
Edge Position (e) (Y/R): 5/-5 nmi -2.5/-12.5 nmi -11.5/-22.5 nmi
GY (MIM) _
GYR (M/M/M) * (x2) * (x2) * (x2)
The Weather Corridor scenarios are broken into two groups; collocated and non-
collocated weather cells. In the collocated case, as shown in Figure 19, each severity
level was centered on the same point and moved as a single group. The three cases
varied by the distance that the center was from the default route. There were a total of
eleven collocated scenarios, which are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 Weather Corridor Specifications for Collocated Weather Cells
Lateral Position (c): 21 nmi 28 nmi 35 nmi
G (M) * *
GY (M/M) * (x2) * 0
GYR (M/M/M) 0 e (x2) e
The non-collocated scenarios, as shown in Figure 19, all had a centered green weather
cell that extended the entire width of the display. The parameters are shown in Table 7
with all measurements in nautical miles from the default route. Three of the cases had
the yellow and red weather cells collocated while in the fourth case the red weather cell
was moved closer to the default route.
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Table 7 Weather Corridor Specifications for Non-collocated Weather Cells
Lateral Position (c): G Centered (0 nmi)
Y 21 nmi 21 nmi 25 nmi 30 nmi
R 15 nmi 21 nmi 25 nmi 30 nmi
GY (M/M) e *(x2) e
GYR (M/MIM) * (x2) * *
The scenarios were assigned in a random sequence to avoid order bias and redundant
scenarios were included to check consistency.
3.3.3 Dependent Variables
During the course of the experiment the pilot specified a series of waypoints using a
mouse. These waypoints were displayed and connected with a line to give the pilot
visual feedback on his route choice. The waypoints were saved when the pilot completed
the scenario. This data was used to produce three different measurements, which were
the closest point of approach, the decision range, and the deviation of the pilot's route as
shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20 Metric Diagram
The closest point of approach (CPA), C, was defined as the shortest distance between
the pilot's chosen route and the weather within the scenario. This calculation was
repeated for each severity level (green, yellow, or red) contained in the scenario.
Decision range, R, was defined as the distance from the weather where the pilot began
to reroute around the hazard. This reroute point is defined as the point when the pilot
leaves the scenario's default route. The decision range was calculated for each level of
severity.
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Deviation is the maximum lateral distance between the pilot's chosen route and the
default route. The default route is the shortest and any deviation off of this route
increases both fuel cost and delay. It was believed that the pilot would want to limit
deviation as a way of limiting economic cost.
3.4 Results
Several general conclusions can be made about the pilot's behavior. Green weather
seemed to have little to no effect on route acceptability and in several cases the pilot
simply chose to fly directly through a green weather cell even if deviating less than 15
nmi laterally would have avoided it. Yellow and Red weather were never penetrated,
suggesting that any contact with these weather types is considered hazardous.
3.4.1 Histograms
Figure 21 shows a histogram of the red weather decision range data for all Lateral
Coverage, Distance, and Lateral Position scenarios. The data shows that 83% of the time
the pilot made a re-route decision at some point between 13 - 24 nmi from the red cell
hazard. The yellow decision range histogram, Figure 22, states that the pilot's decision
range for yellow weather cells was in the region between 8 nmi - 19 nmi 81% of the
time. The yellow range histogram contains a mix of scenarios with only green and
yellow cells along with scenarios that have green, yellow, and red cells.
The decision range data tends to have a relatively dense distribution considering the
large number of differences between the scenarios, including the weather's size, lateral
position, and the range to the weather.
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Figure 21 Red Decision Range Histogram
(Lateral Coverage, Distance, and Lateral Position Scenarios, n=18)
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Figure 22 Yellow Decision Range Histogram
(Lateral Coverage, Distance, and Lateral Position Scenarios, n=31)
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A histogram for the CPAs to red weather for all the single weather cell scenarios is
shown in Figure 23. 88% of the cases had a CPA between 10 and 17 nmi suggesting this
region is an acceptable CPA to maintain around red hazards. The yellow hazard CPA
histogram contained in Figure 24 states that 97% of the cases have a CPA between 2 - 8
nmi and implying this is considered an acceptable buffer region. The yellow CPA
histogram also combines data from scenarios that had red cells.
It is also important to note that the overall distribution is relatively dense considering
the variability in the conditions contained within the scenarios. The scenarios included in
this histogram vary over a large number of sizes, ranges (r), and lateral positions (c)
while still remaining relatively consistent with respect to CPA.
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Figure 23 Red CPA Histogram
(Lateral Coverage, Range, and Lateral Position Scenarios, n=18)
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Figure 24 Yellow CPA Histogram
(Lateral Coverage, Distance, and Lateral Position Scenarios, n=31)
3.4.2 CPA vs. Scenario Type for Lateral Coverage Scenarios
Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the CPA data for red and yellow weather cells plotted
against the Lateral Coverage scenario type. These figures show that there seems to be a
trend between perceived threat (roughly equivalent to weather size) and CPA. The
scenarios are ordered in what was approximated to be the increasing weather threat. The
order was defined by the increasing size of the cells, moving from small to medium and
finally to large. The scenarios with mixed sizes were ordered internally, with medium
sized yellow considered more threatening that a small yellow cell when the other cells are
equal.
Generally, the graph suggests that as the weather size increases the CPA also
increases. This trend is not statistically significant due to the small sample size.
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Figure 25 Red CPA vs. Scenario Type for Lateral Coverage Scenarios
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Figure 26 Yellow CPA vs. Scenario Type for Lateral Coverage Scenarios
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The scenarios that contained only large weather cells (L/L/L) were treated differently
by the pilot than the other scenarios. These scenarios were different since the entire width
of the display was blocked with weather. In the other scenarios the pilot plotted a route
that either penetrated or deviated around the weather. However, in the cases with only
large weather cells the pilot chose a route that pushed towards the edge as shown in
Figure 27. As a result the pilot deferred the final route decision until more data about the
surrounding region could be obtained. The pilot would most likely reassess the situation
as the aircraft approached the weather and ultimately make a decision to either penetrate,
locate a "hole" of less severe weather, or turn back. The overall effect is that the pilot
will defer a decision until the uncertainty in the decision has been resolved or a decision
must be made based on the available information. If there is no "hole" in the foreseeable
future the decision might be made to fly a route that penetrates severe even though it
would normally be considered unacceptable. If absolutely no safe route exists the
decision would be made to reverse course.
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Figure 27 Deferred Decision Example
3.4.3 Shifting Weather Position of Single Cells
Using the data from the Distance and Lateral Position scenarios it was possible to
correlate the movement of a single weather cell across the path of an aircraft with the
pilot's measured deviations. Figure 28 shows the pilot's deviation (vertical axis) plotted
against the location of the rightmost edge of the red cell, e (horizontal axis). For
example, an edge position value of -5 indicates that the weather's edge is 5 nmi away
from the default route while +5 indicates that the route penetrates 5 nmi into the weather.
The solid minimum deviation line marks the cutoff between penetrating and remaining
63
. I -r-
clear of the weather cell. Deviation data from the tested scenarios are shown as squares
in the figure. As long as the actual deviation remains above the required minimum
deviation the pilot successfully avoided the weather cell. The difference between the
deviation line and the minimum deviation line is an approximation of the CPA. When
the right edge is a large distance to the left of the route no reroute is necessary and the
data shows the pilot in fact did not deviate. Assuming no deviation is made as the cell
moves to the right, the CPA would become smaller and smaller until the aircraft
penetrates. However the data shows that the pilot does make a deviation maneuver to
avoid entering the cell. It is clear that the pilot is matching the motion of the weather
with deviation though at a slightly slower rate, thus leading to a decreasing CPA. This
illustrates the interplay between safety and economic cost. However at some point the
deviation cost to go to the right of the single-cell hazard will be greater than going to the
left and the pilot will then begin to reroute on the left side.
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Figure 28 Red Weather Deviation vs. Shifting Weather Position
A similar graph can be drawn in the case with a yellow weather cell and is shown in
Figure 29. However there are a few differences in the overall behavior. It should be
noted that the pilot seems less inclined to deviate from the yellow hazard and thus the
distance between the deviation line and the right edge of the cell is decreasing more
rapidly when compared to red weather case. This change in behavior also causes a
decline in the maintained CPA to the weather cell.
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Figure 29 Yellow Weather Deviation vs. Shifting Weather Position
3.4.4 CPA vs. Range from Weather
The data also suggested the existence of a relation between CPA and the range the
pilot was from hazard as shown in Figure 30. However, the relation is not statistically
significant to a significance level of 0.10 for either the red or yellow CPA lines. The
most likely reason is that the overall number of samples are too small to get a good
significance measurement using the t-test for a regression coefficient.
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Figure 30 CPA vs. Weather Range for Distance Scenarios
3.5.5 Deviation vs. Weather Position for Weather Corridor Scenarios
The dual-cell weather corridor scenario data can be combined to illustrate the
connection between deviation and the weather's edge position as shown in Figure 31 and
Figure 32. Due to the constrained nature of the space and the pilot's instruction to
deviate as much as deemed safe, the measured deviation actually reduces the CPA
maintained between the weather and the aircraft. The deviation decreases to zero as the
edge position shifts to the right. This behavior is expected since the weather corridor
scenario's weather is symmetric and the maximum CPA is reached when the aircraft
travels straight and deviation is zero. Again, the data shows that the pilot is willing to
come close to yellow weather if constrained.
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Figure 31 Red Weather Deviation for the Weather Corridor Scenarios
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Figure 32 Yellow Weather Deviation for the Weather Corridor Scenarios
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Chapter 4 Decision Models
4.0 Decision Models
The data gathered in the experiment can be used to create a decision model that would
simulate pilot behavior in the presence of severe weather. The pilot decisions were
generally consistent, but contained some scatter or variability between similar scenarios.
Two different decision models were considered, with the goal of modeling the pilot's
decision-making demonstrated in the experiment. One model is randomized, based on
the collected histogram data. The second model is a belief network, which attempts to
capture the pilot's situational awareness and generate a weather threat metric.
4.1 Basic Decision-Aid
A basic decision-aid that can use either decision model as input was developed and is
shown in Figure 33. Given a particular weather situation, the actual route's CPAs and
ranges are calculated for both the yellow and red severity levels. As a comparison, CPA
thresholds and decision range threshold values are then generated using one of the two
decision models. If the measured CPA values are greater than the threshold values the
system goes back into supervisory mode and is periodically rechecked to determine if the
route is acceptable. If the measured CPA values are less than the threshold CPA values,
the current route is considered unacceptable to the pilot. The measured range is then
compared to the threshold decision ranges. If measured range is greater than the
threshold decision range, the system defers and waits until the next route check. If the
measured range is equal to or less than the decision range, then the pilot would decide to
reroute immediately. A new route is chosen by increasing the deviation off the initial
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route and repeating the CPA test until an acceptable route is found. One potential method
to develop a new route that achieves the target CPA and decision-range is the Gears
Algorithm (Irvine, 1998). The route chosen would be locally optimal because it would be
the route with the minimum economic cost that still satisfies the CPA requirements.
Figure 33 Basic Weather Rerouting Model
It is important to notice that at least based on the observed pilot behavior, risk is a
function of CPA and weather severity and is not directly dependent on the range to the
hazard. Thus, CPA and severity level are used first to determine whether a reroute is
needed. If so, then the decision range data is used to determine when the reroute should
begin.
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4.2 Randomized Model
The randomized model attempts to capture the pilot's behavior and has an advantage
in that it accounts for some of the variability that occurs with human decision-making.
The primary drawback of the model is that the generated behavior is not directly
dependent on the perceived metrics in a particular situation.
Pilot behavior is captured by the specification of a cumulative mass function (CMF)
for CPA and decision range for each severity. The cumulative mass function is the
probability that the actual value is less than or equal to a given threshold and is generated
from the CPA and decision range histograms. Examples of a histogram and its
complementary cumulative mass function are shown in Figure 34.
4 1.0
3 0.75
C.)1
2 M 0.5
0
1 ,0.25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Histogram Cumulative Mass Function
Figure 34 Example Histogram and Cumulative Mass Function
The randomized model uses a CMIF to generate a predicted acceptable CPA and
decision range value for each weather encounter. For each encounter, a random number
would be chosen between 0 and 1 using a uniform distribution. The random number is
used to pick a threshold value by picking the value in the CMF that has the probability
equal to the random number. As shown in Figure 34, the random variable of "a" would
result in choosing x = 4 as the output. This action converts the uniform distribution of
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the random variable into the weighted distribution of the histogram. This occurs because
the more likely a particular value is, the more height it occupies in the region between 0
and 1, thus increasing the probability that it will be chosen.
Due to the probabilistic nature of the choice of the route metrics, variability will exist
between the decision-aid's generated routes even when given the same scenario. The
variability occurs in both the decision range and the required CPA. An example of the
route distribution based on the subject pilot's decision histograms is shown in Figure 35.
The effect is that the routes will be located in the space between the minimum and
maximum value of CPA and Decision Range. The distribution of the routes will depend
on distribution of the CPA and Decision Range CMFs.
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Figure 35 Route Variability Schematic
4.2.1 Performance
The actual performance of the randomized model is hard to assess because the
measured error would actually be an error distribution for each situation instead of a
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single constant. This behavior results from the model generating a value based on a
random number and the cumulative mass function, versus the measured values from the
actual situation. If the situation were repeatedly run through the decision-aid for a large
number of iterations, the error distribution would reflect the original histogram. The
implication is that the performance of the system would be described by the variance of
the original histogram and also by the shape of the distribution. The histogram's variance
is important since it describes the width of the distribution. If a distribution was
concentrated over a small number of values the overall error would be substantially less
than if the number of possible values varied over a large series of numbers. The shape of
the distribution also effects the error histogram since certain distributions would reduce
the net error of the system. For example a histogram with a normal distribution would
have the pilot's measured values closer to the center of the distribution thus resulting in a
net lower error when compared to a distribution with two regions of concentrated
probability. The selected value would always be in one region or the other, thus resulting
in more error over a large number of iterations.
Performance would be assessed on how similar the system is to the human pilot. The
primary metric in this case would be if the system is generally more conservative or more
aggressive than the pilot. It should also be noted that an overly conservative system
would not be beneficial since unnecessary rerouting would occur.
4.3 Belief Network
A belief network was designed to capture the behavior of the pilot in this project and
is shown in Figure 36. The belief network is made up of two independent sub-trees that
account for CPA (or duration, should the route penetrate weather) and weather cell
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severity, as measured by its general size. The Weather Threat node then combines these
sub-trees into a single recommendation that can be used by the pilot agent to assess a
weather route's threat level.
The measured values are fed in at the lowest level of the tree represented by the oval
nodes. In actual practice the oval nodes fuzzify the numerical data into a series of states.
The current design uses three main states for the CPA nodes, which are Unacceptable,
Marginal, and Acceptable. The unacceptable state is one that describes a value that is
considered to be dangerous independent of any other factors. The Acceptable state
describes a value that would be acceptable independent of other factors. One example
would be a CPA value of 100 nautical miles since the weather is no threat to the aircraft.
The Marginal state is more ambiguous in that the value is in the gray area between the
two and depends on the other variables to determine if the route is actually acceptable.
The CPA nodes were set to Unacceptable if the default route crossed yellow or red
weather. The Marginal and Acceptable states depended on the pilot histogram defined as
the region that contained most of the data points in the experiment. The Marginal state
was set when the CPA to a weather cell was within the histogram's bounds and
considered Acceptable if the CPA was greater than the maximum value in the histogram.
The Duration nodes have four states, which are Unacceptable, Marginal, Acceptable,
and None. If the route does not enter weather the duration nodes are set to None. In this
experiment, any exposure to yellow and red weather was considered Unacceptable since
the pilot never decided to enter either type, though additional experiments might suggest
situations where entering yellow or even red weather might be considered Marginal or
Acceptable. The CPA and Duration node, which depends directly on the underlying CPA
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nodes and Duration nodes has four states: Acceptable, Low risk, Medium risk, and High
risk.
The Size nodes (one each for green, yellow, and red cells) are broken up as they were
in the experiment's scenarios with each having three states, which are Small, Medium,
and Large. These lead to the Severity node, with states of Minimal, Low, Medium, and
Severe.
Figure 36 Prototype Weather Threat Belief Network
The relations between the nodes of the belief networks are specified in matrices
referred to as conditional probability tables (CPTs), as discussed in Chapter 2. An
example of the CPT between CPA & Duration, Severity, and Weather Threat nodes is
shown below in Table 8. All of the CPTs for the entire belief network are listed in
Appendix B. The CPT is multi-dimensional and is a function of the number of nodes
feeding into it. In this case the complete CPT is three-dimensional to account for the
76
different states in each of the two parent nodes (CPA & Duration, and Severity) and the
states within the Weather Threat node. The CPT determines the value that each of the
states of Weather Threat will contain when the belief network is updated with the data
from the situation. For example, if the combined severity of the weather was Medium
and the CPA & Duration measurements are Low risk the Continue state value in the
Weather Threat node would be 0.7. The other states of Weather Threat will depend on
the CPT relations as shown in Table 8.
Table 8 CPT between Severity and CPA & Duration Nodes for Weather Threat State "Continue"
Severity
Minimal Low Medium Severe
Acceptable 1.0 1.0 1.0 1
.2 Low Risk 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.6
a Medium Risk 0.6 0.3 0.1 0
0 High Risk 0.5 0.2 0 0
U
The scenarios from the experiment were used to calibrate and test the belief network
model. The scenario parameters (CPA, duration, and weather cell size) were input into
the base nodes of the network and the weather threat state probabilities were generated
for each scenario. The sum of the four weather threat state probabilities (Continue, Low
Risk, Medium Risk, and High Risk) equals one. To tune the relationship between
weather threat state values and the thresholds for CPA and range, a linear optimization
program was used to select optimal costs that minimized the error between the predicted
CPA and decision range values from Equation 6 and the measured CPA and decision
range values from the pilot. Separate constants were determined for each of the decision-
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aid's outputs of Red CPA, Yellow CPA, and for Red decision range and Yellow decision
range. The optimized constants are shown in Table 9. The threshold values for
acceptable CPA and decision range for yellow and red weather cells can be calculated
using equation 6 and the optimized constants. Equation 7 shows an example of the red
CPA threshold calculation using Equation 6 and an assumed weather threat state vector.
Threshold Value for CPA or range = AL+ BM + CH
where A, B, and C are constants
(6)
L = [Low Risk State Value]
M = [Medium Risk State Value]
H =[High Risk State Value]
Table 9 Optimized Constants
Yellow CPA Red Range Yellow Range
A 13.9 6.2 21.7 17.85
B 13.95 6.25 21.75 17.9
C 14.0 6.25 21.8 17.95
Weather Threat =
Continue
Low Risk
Medium Risk
High Risk
~ 0.3
0.4
0.25
_ 
_0.05_
Red CPA Threshold = 13.9-0.4+13.95 -0.25 +14.0 -0.05 = 9.75 nmi
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Red CPA
(7)
4.3.1 Performance
As an initial check of performance, the belief network was exposed to the same
weather situations as the pilot was in the initial study. Figure 37 and Figure 38 show the
error histograms for Yellow and Red CPA predictions calculated from comparing the
measured experimental results versus the predicted results from the model. Negative
error means that the predicted value was greater than the experimental value and thus the
belief network suggested a more conservative option than the pilot. A positive error
suggests that the model is more aggressive than the pilot. About 50% of the Red CPA
predictions have 0 error or are more conservative than the pilot and 83% are within 1 nmi
of the actual CPA or are more conservative. 65% of the yellow CPA predictions have 0
error or are more conservative than the data measured from the pilot.
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Figure 37 Red CPA Error Histogram (n=18)
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Figure 38 Yellow CPA Error Histogram (n=31)
Figure 39 and Figure 40 show the error histograms for the Yellow and Red Decision
Range predictions. Negative error means that the predicted value was greater than the
experimental value and thus the belief network suggested a more conservative option
than the pilot while a positive error suggests that the model is more aggressive than the
pilot. About 56% of the red decision range predictions have zero error or are more
conservative than the pilot. 59% of the yellow range predictions have zero error or are
more conservative than the data measured from the pilot and 72% are within 1 nmi of the
actual decision range or more conservative.
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Figure 39 Red Decision Range Error Histogram (n= 6)
16-
14-
12-
10-
8
6-
4-
2-
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Range Error (ni)
Figure 40 Yellow Decision Range Error Histogram (n=29)
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4.4 Validation Scenarios
A second data set was then collected from the pilot to validate the model (which was
based on data from the first experiment). The validation scenarios consisted of seven
scenarios repeated from the first experiment and twelve new scenarios, which use
different weather dimensions and weather locations than the first experiment. Table 10
shows the weather dimensions from the Validation Scenarios. All cases involved single-
cell scenarios where the cross-track dimensions were modified slightly. The most
significant change was the variation of the along-track dimension of the weather across
the different sizes, which was not done during the first experiment.
Table 10 Validation Scenarios Weather Dimensions
Type: Dimensions (Cross-Track x Along-Track Axes)
Green Yellow Red
Small (S) 17.5 x 10 nmi 10 x 5 nmi 3.5 x 2.5 nmi
Medium (M) 22.5 x 15 nmi 15 x 10 nmi 7.5 x 5 nmi
Large (L) 27.5 x 20 nmi 20 x 15 nmi 12.5 x 10 nmi
Table 11 shows the lateral positions of the weather in the validation scenarios,
(specified in nautical miles). There were eight different scenario types that varied the
relative locations of the different severity levels on the left and right sides of the default
route. Ten of the twelve validation scenarios used the medium weather size. The last
two scenarios consisted of all three severity levels of which one was made up of large
weather cells and the other small weather cells. Both of these scenarios were centered on
the route and all three cells had a lateral position of zero. All the weather cells were
located 60 nmi ahead of the subject aircraft.
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Figure 41 and Figure 42 show the pilot's red and yellow decision range histograms for
the validation scenarios. 85% of the scenarios had a red decision range between 18 and
25 nmi from the hazard (compared to between 13 and 24 in the first experiment). The
yellow decision range histogram states that the pilot's decision range is between 13 and
20 nmi 83% of the time (compared to between 8 and 19 in the first experiment).
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Figure 41 Validation Scenario Red Decision Range Histogram
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Figure 42 Validation Scenario Yellow Decision Range Histogram
A histogram for the red CPAs for the validation scenarios are shown in Figure 43.
77% of the scenarios had a CPA between 10 and 16 nmi which is very similar to the
results from the first experiment (between 10 and 17 nmi). The yellow hazard CPA
histogram shown in Figure 44 states the 89% of the scenarios have yellow CPAs between
2 and 7 nmi (similar to the 2 to 8 nmi suggested in the first experiment).
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Figure 43 Validation Scenario Red CPA Histogram (n = 13)
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Figure 44 Validation Scenario Yellow CPA Histogram (n = 18)
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The belief network was then exposed to the same validation scenarios, but using the
parameters that had been tuned from the first set of data. Figure 45 and Figure 46 show
the red and yellow CPA error histograms for the validation scenarios. 77% of the red
CPA predictions had 0 error or were more conservative than the pilot though no data
point had more than 7 nmi error. The yellow CPA predictions had 0 error or were more
conservative 78% of the time. 94% of the scenarios were within 1 nmi of the pilot's
choice or are more conservative.
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Figure 45 Validation Scenario Red CPA Error Histogram (n = 13)
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Figure 46 Validation Scenario Yellow CPA Error Histogram (n =18)
Figure 47 and Figure 48 show the red and yellow range error histograms. The red
range predictions had 0 error or were more conservative than the pilot 31% of the time.
44% of the yellow range predictions had zero error or were more conservative than the
pilot's preference.
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Figure 47 Validation Scenarios Red Range Error Histogram (n = 13)
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Figure 48 Validation Scenarios Yellow Range Error Histogram (n = 18)
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4.4.1 Results
The pilot behavior measured in the validation scenarios is generally consistent with
the data gathered during the first experiment. Though the most of the validation
scenarios were different from the first experiment in the size of the hazards, the position
of the hazards, and the variability between scenarios, the histograms from each set of
scenarios were fairly similar in both shape and bounds. It also appears that CPA, the size
of the hazards, and the range from a hazard capture the pilot's behavior when faced with
simplified weather situations.
The error histograms implied that the belief network model was fairly effective in
capturing the pilot's general behavior in both the scenarios that were used to train it and
in the validation scenarios. However, the CPA error histograms had a lower variance
than the decision range error histograms suggesting that the belief network was more
effective at generating CPA values that were closer to the pilot's preferred CPA.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
As a result of increasing traffic congestion and the desire to have more accurate
predictions of traffic flow in complex situations, it is becoming necessary to develop
large-scale simulations that would involve hundreds of aircraft to allow the validation and
testing of system enhancements. Currently this type of simulation is difficult and
expensive to run since the number of humans that would have to be involved is somewhat
intractable. The use of autonomous agents would be one solution to the problem though
an accurate model of pilot behavior would be required to allow the agents to react in a
similar manner to a real pilot. Though developing a complete model of all pilot behavior
in every situation would be impossible in the short term, it is possible to model a subset
of the pilot's behavior, which in this case was limited to the pilot's reactions in the
presence of adverse weather.
Through the use of a preliminary survey, a series of initial scenarios, and a set of
validation scenarios a pilot's basic assessment model was probed, quantified, and
validated. Two models were explored: a randomized model that captures the variability
in the pilot's decision-making, even when posed with the same situation twice, and a
belief network model that attempts to capture the basic situational awareness parameters
affecting the rerouting decision.
Based on the subject's performance data, it appears that the closest point of approach
(CPA) of the current route relative to a hazard is the driving factor in determining if a
new routing is required. Once the decision to reroute is made the determination of
whether to begin the resolution maneuver at the current time depends on the range of the
aircraft to the hazard. Other factors such as the size and the severity of the hazard serve
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primarily to define the acceptable values for CPA and decision range. Though the
models are relatively simple, the data gathered in both experiments suggest that the
pilot's behavior is captured reasonably well by both the belief network and randomized
models.
5.2 Behavior Model Extension
Since pilots may not agree on the correct maneuver to make in every situation, it is
important to address the issues associated with gathering data from multiple pilots.
Several methodologies could be used to develop a model that works for more than one
pilot, but each has its benefits and problems.
One of the simplest techniques would be to gather pilot data by presenting pilots with
the same scenarios and measuring the CPAs and decision ranges that the pilot considered
acceptable in a particular situation. The data from individual pilots would then be
averaged to produce a combined histogram representing all the pilots' behavior.
However, this method could also produce a histogram that does not model any single
pilot well since the averaging operation loses information from any particular histogram
and thus reduces the accuracy of the model for any particular pilot.
Another technique would take the generated histograms from multiple pilots and sort
them from conservative to aggressive, or along some other axis of behavior. The sorting
action creates a third dimension to the histograms that would allow for the selection of
the level of the pilot's aggressiveness as another variable. Individually the histograms
directly model an individual pilot so the accuracy of the model should be unaffected.
This technique also has some drawbacks since there might be some difficulty in sorting
by aggressiveness since a pilot might be aggressive in a particular part of their behavior,
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but conservative in other situations. A second problem is that this technique would
generate a large number of models, which might not be necessary for a system-wide
simulation. It is of interest to note, however, that similar methods have been applied in
other large-scale autonomous agent simulations, notably for modeling automobile driver
behavior and the resulting traffic congestion in roadway systems.
5.3 Future Work
This experiment limited the assessment of pilot behavior to a single, current jet
transport pilot. The behavior of additional pilots needs to be assessed and quantified to
determine if the tested pilot is indeed representative of the larger pilot pool. Once the
data is collected it would also be possible to determine how similar the behavior of one
pilot is when compared to another and may allow individual pilots to be grouped into
behavior categories and the relative frequency of each of the behaviors forming a
distribution of pilot behavior. This distribution could then be used by large-scale
simulations to populate the aircraft with autonomous agents with the right assortment of
pilot behaviors to model the interactions in the real system.
Since adverse weather is not the only type of hazard that confronts a pilot, the
behavior model would need to be extended to support the other important hazards in the
pilot's decision space. One example would be the introduction of other aircraft because a
weather avoidance maneuver is not independent of the other aircraft in the region. Other
aircraft might also be making resolution maneuvers around weather, which might be in
conflict with the pilot's current rerouting option thus requiring additional rerouting or
negotiation between the aircraft.
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Finally, the weather situations considered here were relatively simplistic, using
ellipsoidal representations of only one or two isolated storm cells. Certainly the weather
modeling must be improved in order to handle more realistic situations including large-
scale line storms or other convective weather. This will require a significant effort since
the true basis for decision-making is believed to be extremely complex and will likely not
be adequately captured by the few metrics used in the model presented here.
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Appendix B
Belief Net CPT Values
CPA & Duration Node CPT Values
CPA & Duration State
Red Red CPA Yellow Yellow CPA
Duration Node Duration de
Node Node C
Unacceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 10 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 10 0 1
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None
Unacceptable
Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal j0 0 0 1
Acceptable
Unacceptable
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
Marginal -0 10 10 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None
Unacceptable
Marginal
Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1_1
Acceptable
Unacceptable
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
Marginal 10 10 0 1
Acceptable
| Unacceptable
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
Marginal 0 0 J0 11
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
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Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None
Unacceptable
Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 10 0
Acceptable
Unacceptable
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
Marginal 0 0 0 1 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None Unacceptable 0 0 1
Marginal 0 J0 0
Acceptable
Unacceptable Unacceptable
0
0
0
0
0
0.4
1
0.6
Marginal 10 10.5 10.4 (0.1
Acceptable 0.1 0.4 0.5 0
Marginal Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1
Marginal 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Acceptable 0.35 0.55 0.1 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Marginal 0.3 0.7 0 0
Acceptable 0.6 0.4 0 0
None
Unacceptable
Unacceptable 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1
Marginal 0.5 10.3 10.2 [0
Acceptable
Unacceptable
0.7
0
0.3
0.2
0
0.5
0
0.3
Marginal 0 0.3 0.5 10.2
Acceptable 0.1 0.2 0.7 0
Marginal Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Marginal 0.3 0.4 0.3 0
Acceptable 0.7 0.3 0 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0.6 0.3 0.1 0
Marginal 0.8 0.2 0 0
Acceptable 0.9 0.1 0 0
None Unacceptable 0.1 0.5 0.4 0
Marginal (0.4 j0.6 j0 10
Acceptable
Unacceptable Unacceptable
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Marginal 0 0 10 1_ _
Acceptable
100
0 0 0 1
as
+0
C.)
+.j
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None Unacceptable 0 0
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0
0 0 1Unacceptable Unacceptable 0 0.1 0.2
Marginal 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Acceptable 0.3 0.5
Marginal Unacceptable 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1
Marginal 0.3 0.4 0.3 0
Acceptable 0.8 0.2 0 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Marginal 0.6 0.4 0 0
Acceptable 0.9 0.1 0 0
None Unacceptable 0.1 0.3
0.6 0Marginal 10.4 I 0.4 10.2 10
Acceptable 0.9 09 0.1 0 0Unacceptable Unacceptable 0 0.2
Marginal 0.1 -0.2 10.7 10
Acceptable 0.1 0.3 0.6
Marginal Unacceptable 0.2 0.6 0.2 0
Marginal 0.6 0.4 0 0
Acceptable 1 0 0 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Marginal 0.7 0.3 0 0
Acceptable 1 0 0 0
None Unacceptable 0.2 0.5 0.3 0Marginal 1.4 1.5 1.1 10
Acceptable 1 1000Unacceptable Unacceptable 0 0
Marginal o 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 0 0 0 1
Acceptable 0 0 0 1
None Unacceptable 0 0 0 1
Marginal 10 0 0 1
Acceptable
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-4
0
0
0
0
0 1
0 0 1
0.7
0.2 0
0.6 0
0.1 0 0
0.6 0.2
0
0.3 0
0 0 0
0 1
1
Unacceptable I Unacceptable 0 0.3 I 0.4 0.3
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Marginal 0.15 0.45 0.3 0.1
Acceptable 0.3 0.5 0.2 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0 0.5 0.3 0.2
Marginal 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1
Acceptable 0.2 0.7 0.1 0
None
Unacceptable
Acceptable 0
Marginal 0.1 [0.4 10.4 10.1
Marginal 10.1 10.3 0.5 0.1
0, 7 ,0 ,10.2
Marginal [0 0 j 0.6 0.4
Marginal Unacceptable 0 0.4 0.5 0.1
Marginal 0.4 0.4 0.2 0
Acceptable 0 0.4 0.6 0
Acceptable Unacceptable 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Marginal 0.7 0.3 0 0
Acceptable 1 0 0 0
Marginal [0.7 10.3 10 10
Acceptable 1
0
0
0.4
0
0.6
0.1 0.3
0
Severity Node CPT Values
Severity Node States
Green Yellow Red Size
Size Node Size Node Node o C
Large
Medium 0 0.2 0.55 0.25
Small 0 0.6 0.4 0
Medium Large 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Medium 0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Small 0.1 0.45 0.45 0
None 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
large 0Medium 0.05
0.6
Small
0.45 0.5
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Q
0
None
Unacceptable 0 0.3 10.4 0.3
Acceptable 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Unacceptable 0 0.3 0.5 0.2
0.7 0.1
Unacceptable 10
Acceptable 0 0.4 0.6 0
Unacceptable 0.6 0
Large 0 0 0.2 0.8
None 0.1 0.3 0
Large 0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Small 10.1 10.7 [0.2 0
None
Large
0.3 0.6 0.1
t t r - -0 0 0.3
|0
Medium 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Small 0.3 0.7 0 0
None 1 0 0
I I ___None_
Large 0 0 0.2
0
0.8
Medium 0 0.2 0.55 0.25
Small 0 0.6 0.4 0
None 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Medium Large 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Medium 0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Small 0.1 0.65 0.25 0
None 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Small Large 0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Medium 0.05 0.45 0.5 0
Small 0.1 0.7 0.2 0
None 0.3 0.6 0.1 0
Large 0 0 0.3 0.7
Medium 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Small 0.3 0.7 0 0
None
INone
Large
1
0
0
0
0
0.2
0
0.8
Medium 0 0.2 0.55 0.25
Small 0 10.6 0.4 0
None 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Medium Large 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
Medium 0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Small 0.1 0.65 0.25 0
None 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Small Large 0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Medium 0.05 0.45 0.5 0
Small 0.1 0.7 0.2 0
None 0.3 0.6 0.1 0
None
Large
Medium
Large 0 0 0.3 0.7
Medium 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Small 0.3 0.7 10 0
None 1
NoneI 0
0
0
0
0.2
0
0.8
Medium 0 0.2 0.55 0.25
Small 0 0.4 0.4 0.2
None 0.1 0.6 0.34- 4-1 -t
Large 0 0.1 0.2
0
0.7
Medium 10 10.3 [0.5 10.2
Small 0.1
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0.4 0.4 0.1
Large
None
Large
None
Large
S
0.7
None 0.2 0.5 0.3 0
Small Large 0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Medium 0.05 0.35 0.4 0.2
Small 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1
None 0.3 0.6 0.1 0
None Large 0 0 0.3 0.7
Medium 0.1 0.6 0.3 0
Small 0.2 0.6 0.2 0
None 1 0 0 0
Large arge 0 0.1 0.5 0.4
Medium 0 0.2 0.7 0.1
Small 0.4 0.3 0.3 0
None 0.6 0.4 0 0
Medium Large 0 0.2 0.6 0.2
Medium 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Small 0.8 0.2 0 0
_ _ None 0.8 0.2 0 0
Z Small Large 0 0.3 0.5 0.2
Medium 0.2 0.3 0.5 0
Small 0.95 0.05 0 0
None 0.95 0.05 0 0
None Large 0 0 0.2 0.8
Medium 0 0.6 0.4 0
Small 0.8 0.2 0 0
None 1 0 0 0
Weather Threat Node CPT Values
Weather Threat Node States
CPA & Duration Severity .,:
High Risk Severe 0 0 0 1
Medium 0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1
Minimal 0.5 0.3 0.3 0
Medium Risk Severe 0 0.2 0.5 0.3
Medium 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1
Low 0.3 0.4 0.3 0
Minimal 0.6 0.3 0.1 0
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Low Risk Severe 0.6 0.3 0.1 0
Medium 0.7 0.3 0 0
Low 0.75 0.25 0 0
Minimal 0.8 0.2 0 0
Acceptable Severe 1 0 0 0
Medium 1 0 0 0
Low 1 0 0 0
Minimal 1 0 0 0
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